Source:
AfricanArgumentsEditor
An extremely violent
Islamist group based in north east Nigeria, Boko Haram has emerged as a
significant factor in Nigerian politics and security. Once confined to Maidugri
– and driven partly by regional politics – it has now struck in other parts of
the north and in the capital Abuja at the centre of Nigeria. Recent attacks in
Damataru and Maidugri have claimed over 200 lives.
Two years ago the
government claimed victory after the death of its leader, Mohamed Yusuf, after
a battle at its headquarters in Maidugri. Film showed the police randomly
executing civilians, and apparently murdering Yusuf whilst in police custody.
Problem solved said the government. They could not have been more wrong. Boko
Haram has re-emerged, more numerous, better armed and utterly ruthless. It is
able to access easily deployed weaponry such as hand grenades and small arms as
well as more sophisticated explosive devices delivered as car bombs, sometimes
by suicide bombers. In August, it bombed the UN building in Abuja. Deploying
across a wider area, it has launched head-on attacks on police and army. This suggests increasingly sophisticated
co-ordination and the development of internal organisation as well as
substantial financial and material backing.
Since 2001 and the
start of the US-led War on Terror the temptation has been to interpret all
domestic Islamist groups through the prism of international terrorism. This is
plausible. Boko Haram or a faction of it – it may not be a monolithic
organisation – has had contact with members of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and even the Somali ‘Al Shabaab. But the local may be more important
than the global. A more fruitful interpretation comes from an examination of
Nigerian domestic politics rather than global jihad.
The north-east of
Nigeria has been largely excluded from developmental gains that have, to some
extent, occurred in other regions of the country, notably the economically
explosive region around Lagos. Boko Haram’s central demand – the imposition of
Sharia law in Northern states – suggests a rejection of the values of
westernising Nigerian society that has produced obscene largesse for a few. In
addition, the re-election this year of President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian
Southerner from the Delta region, seemed to further signal the decline in the
North’s political power. Since independence the northern political elite have
been the deciding factor in who rules the country. In forming the Peoples
Democratic Party the northern elite helped create a national party which made
sure that power was circulated – rather than shared – so each area took it in
turns to be President and “chop” (steal from the public purse).
In the lead-up to this
year’s election the north argued that since its President, Umaru Yar ‘Adua, had
died in office, they should still retain the presidency. But Goodluck Jonathan,
the vice president and a southerner, outmanoeuvred them and was elected President
in April. Northerners voted heavily for General Muhammadu Buhari, a northerner
and former president who stood aside from the PDP and formed his own
party. But he made almost no effort to
campaign in the south where his party barely existed and he lost heavily. The
resulting fear and anger in the north was expressed by mobs who attacked the
houses of prominent PDP leaders.
That anger may also be
feeding Boko Haram. However, it is not, or does not appear to be, an
organisation run or supported by rich and powerful political figures though it
does receive funding from outside Nigeria we are told by Western security
agencies. It is a local political
movement now fighting a national campaign to pursue its ends. Its recruitment
of predominantly unemployed, poorly educated young Muslim men is made possible
by the national political failure to provide jobs, health or education. When
northern primary school teachers were recently given a national primary-level
exam, nearly all of them failed it. Unemployment in northern cities is
extremely high. Without a decent future, young men are easily drawn into
fanatical movements.
Military action alone
will not defeat the movement. The speed at which the organisation recovered
from its “defeat” by Nigerian security services in 2009 shows the problem is
far from solved. The only long-term solution is the development of the region.
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